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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis seeks to defend transitivity as a rational constraint on preferences 
against two putative counterexamples to transitivity. This thesis is divided into three 
sections. In the first section, I consider two famous and popular arguments in defense of 
transitivity and argue they are insufficient to adequately defend transitivity. I then outline 
a desiderata for successful arguments in defense of transitivity and identify some basic 
assumptions I will be making throughout the thesis. In section two, I consider the first 
putative counterexample to transitivity: Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. I offer two 
plausible interpretations of Quinn’s puzzle and argue that both fail. One because it does 
not genuinely induce intransitive preferences, and the other because the situation it 
requires is logically impossible. I conclude this section by defending my arguments 
against known objections in the literature. Finally, in the third section, I consider a 
counterexample to transitivity from Larry Temkin that has received little attention in the 
literature. I argue that while the initial counterexample is unpersuasive it can be 
augmented and made into a more forceful argument. I then argue that this improved 
counterexample fails due to some erroneous assumptions prevalent in the literature on 
incomparability. I conclude the thesis with a brief summary and some closing remarks.  
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SECTION ONE 
A thesis which set out to argue that intransitive preferences are irrational would 
be boring at best if there are already well-known, cogent arguments in defense of the 
same conclusion. Thus, if my thesis is to be at all interesting I must provide reasons for 
thinking that the standard treatment of the rationality of intransitive preferences is 
insufficient. I think there are such reasons. The purpose of this section is to present two 
standard arguments for the irrationality of intransitive preference sets—the semantic 
argument and the famous money pump argument—and argue these treatments are in 
some form or another, deficient. The consequence of this discussion will be that it is an 
open question, so to speak, as to whether or not transitivity is a constraint on rational 
preferences, and further, if we wish to maintain that intransitive preferences are irrational 
in the face of arguments to the contrary, we are in need of different arguments. I will 
begin this section with the semantic argument as it has been formulated by Donald 
Davidson and John Broome, and offer my reasons for rejecting this approach. I will then 
consider the famous money-pump and offer two competing interpretations of this 
argument. I will argue that neither of these interpretations are sufficient to show that 
intransitive preferences are necessarily irrational. The shortcomings of these arguments 
for intransitivity will illuminate a desiderata for any argument against the rationality of 
intransitive preference orderings and provide a context for remainder of the thesis. 
Throughout this section I will also identify certain assumptions that I will be taking as 
basic, taking care to note when I am making a substantial departure from the traditional 
debate concerning preferences.  
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The Semantic Argument 
 The semantic argument for the transitivity of strict preference was first formulated 
by Donald Davidson, who argued:  
The theory in each case is so powerful and simple and so constitutive of 
concepts assumed by further satisfactory theory (physical or linguistic) that we 
must strain to fit our findings, or our interpretations to preserve the theory. If 
length is not transitive, what does it mean to measure length at all? We could find 
or invent an answer but unless or until we do we must strive to interpret ‘longer 
than’ so that it comes out transitive. Similarly for ‘preferred to’.12  
 
 This line of reasoning suggests that transitivity is just part and parcel of what it 
means to have preferences, and this is supposed to be analogous in some way with the 
measurement with length. It seems plausible that transitivity might be a “property 
embedded in the meaning of the relation” ‘longer than’; however it is unclear as to why 
‘longer than’ is analogous to ‘preferred to’ in the relevant sense.3  
 Davidson did not expound on what he meant, but Jon Broome has given a similar 
argument in defense of the transitivity of ‘better than’ and perhaps this is what Davidson 
has in mind: 
Take any monadic predicate such as ‘dangerous’ [and] designate it with 
the letter ‘F’. We can often form from F a dyadic predicate, or relation, 
designated by ‘more F than’.... Call this the ‘comparative relation’ of F.... A 
comparative relation is necessarily transitive. This is an analytic feature of the 
operator ‘more … than’: the meaning of ‘more … than’ implies that ‘more F than’ 
is transitive.  
 
                                                          
1 Davidson, Donald (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press. 273 
 
2 John Broome has offered a similar argument for the transitivity of “all things considered better than” in 
Broome, John (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford University Press.  
 
3 Anand, Paul (1993). The Philosophy of Intransitive Preference. The Economic Journal, 103, 340 
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Broome concludes that since ‘better than’ just means ‘more good than’, better than is a 
transitive relation. On the assumption that ‘preferred to’ is synonymous with ‘more 
preferable than’ Broome’s argument will generalize to the transitivity of ‘preferred to’.4 
If this is Davidson’s argument, I do not find it convincing. At least one relevant 
difference between length and preference is that while I cannot even imagine a collection 
of strings such that string A is longer than string B, string B is longer than string C, and 
String C is longer than string A; I can imagine a person whose preferences are 
intransitive and often people at least behave as if their preferences are intransitive notably 
in cases of procrastination.5  
What should we make of these people who exhibit intransitive preferences and 
even claim to have intransitive preferences? While I take it to be an open question as to 
whether or not they are rational, it does not seem at all plausible that they are misusing 
the word ‘preference’, and even granting that they are misusing the word, the interesting 
philosophical question is what we should make of their preferential attitudes whatever we 
decide to call them. I side with Larry Temkin that the semantic argument for the 
transitivity of better than is “at best a hollow victory.” “The crucial question is whether a 
                                                          
4 Broome, John (2004). Weighing Lives. Oxford University Press. 50 
 
5 Chrisoula Andreou argues convincingly that “intransitivity, although it has been neglected in the 
literature on procrastination, may be, in one form or another, at the heart of all cases of procrastination.” 
Andreou, Chrisoula (2007). Understanding procrastination. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37 
(2):183–193. p. 184 
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central element of moral and practical reasoning involves an intransitive relation … it 
matters not what we call this element.”67 
I have just concluded what little I have to say about the semantic argument for 
transitivity, I will now consider what I take to be the more forceful argument for 
transitivity: the money-pump argument.  
The Money Pump  
The classic money pump involves Mr. S, a job candidate, who has been offered 
his choice of three positions:8 
a) Full Professor at a salary of 5,000  
b) Associate professor at a salary of 5,500 
c) Assistant professor at a salary of 6,000  
Weighing these options, Mr. S prefers option a to option b, because he feels the better 
rank offsets the small difference in salary. Mr. S prefers option b to option c for the same 
reason; however, because the difference in salary between option c and option a is 
sufficiently large so as to outweigh the difference in rank, Mr. S prefers option c to option 
a. Mr. S is left with the following intransitive preference ordering: a>b>c>a.  
 Now imagine Mr S. is offered a series of trades: 
                                                          
6 Temkin, Larry S. (1996). A continuum argument for intransitivity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 
(3):175–210. 
 
7 It bares noting that Temkin and Broome are discussing the transitivity of ‘better than’ and hence are not 
directly discussing the transitivity of ‘preferred to’. However, I take these issues to be closely related and 
Temkin’s comments are relevant for the debate on preferences as well.  
 
8 I am borrowing this example from Davidson, Donald, John McKinsey and Patrick Suppes, 1955, “Outlines 
of a formal theory of value, I”, Philosophy of Science, 22: 140–160. p 145-146— the locus classicus of the 
money pump argument.  
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 The department head, advised of Mr. S's preferences, says, 'I see you 
prefer b to c, so I will let you have the associate professorship-for a small 
consideration. The difference must be worth something to you.' Mr. S. agrees to 
slip the department head $25 to get the preferred alternative. Now the department 
head says, 'Since you prefer a to b, I'm prepared-if you will pay me a little for my 
trouble-to let you have the full professorship.' Mr. S. hands over another $25 and 
starts to walk away, well satisfied, we may suppose. 'Hold on,' says the 
department head, 'I just realized you'd rather have c than a. And I can arrange 
that-provided . . .’9 
 
Mr. S has been turned into a money pump: as we pump water from a water pump, 
we pump money from Mr. S; indeed, the cynical department head could continue to offer 
Mr. S trades until Mr. S has been financially ruined and all because Mr. S’s preferences 
are intransitive.10  
I am to infer on the basis that Mr. S’s preferences have led him to be a money 
pump that he is irrational, but is not clear how this inference is supposed to go. Although 
the money pump argument has been the standard argument in defense of transitivity since 
it was introduced by Davidson et al. what exactly the argument is supposed to be has not 
been universally agreed upon. There seem to be two schools of thought prevalent in the 
                                                          
9 Ibid 146 Davidson et al don’t call this argument a money pump argument nor do they draw the 
connection to Ramsey’s famous Dutch-book argument- Ramsey, Frank P., 1928, “Truth and Probability”, 
in The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, ed. R. B. Braithwaite, London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1950. 
 
10 Technically this version of the argument only applies to agents with cyclical preferences which are a 
subset of intransitive preferences. Suppose an agent’s preferences are such that a>b>c~a. This agent’s 
preferences are intransitive: a is preferred to b and b is preferred to c but a is not preferred to c, here the 
standard money pump won’t work because the agent need not trade a for c to satisfy her preferences. 
Rabinowicz argues that in the case I have described the money pump can be salvaged by offering an 
incentive, small enough that the agent will suffer and overall loss but large enough that agent now prefers 
c to a, but it is not clear that this solution will generalize satisfactorily to other cases of intransitivity like 
instances where a>b>c and c is on a par with a, c is incomparable with a.  See footnote 7 in Rabinowicz, 
W.: 2008, “Pragmatic Arguments for Rationality Constraints”, in: M.C. Galavotti, R. Scazzieri, and P. 
Suppes (eds.) Reasoning, Rationality, and Probability, Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 139-163 for the 
discussion of money pumps for intransitive acyclical preferences and Chang, Ruth (2002). The possibility 
of parity. Ethics 112 (4):659-688 for the discussion of parity. 
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literature. One school sees the argument as a logical continuation of Frank Ramsey’s 
Dutch-Book argument.11 This understanding of the Money Pump argument goes 
something like this:  
1. No rational set of preferences would lead an agent to take a series of trades that 
leaves her having lost money and better off in no respect.  
2. If an agents preferences are intransitive, then that agent could be made to take a 
series of trades which leave them worse off in one respect and better off in no 
other.  
3. So, intransitive preferences are irrational. 
This appears to be the understanding Frederick Schick has in mind when he 
argued that an agent could avoid being pumped if only he planned accordingly:  
Does a person with cyclical preferences have no grounds for declining offers? 
Let him look back and see the arrangements he has already paid for. He may then 
come to see which way the wind is blowing, that if he accepts the current offer, he 
will then get another, and then another, and still another, every cycle bringing him 
back to where he was at the start, only poorer. Seeing what is in store for him, he 
may well reject the offer and thus stop the pump.12  
 
Schick’s argument that an agent with cyclical preferences need not be exploited is 
only relevant on the assumption that the exploitability of the agent is what makes the 
intransitive irrational. In a similar vein, Edward McClennen argues that the agent could 
avoid being exploited if only the agent chose resolutely.13 Wlodek Rabinowicz and Tom 
Dougherty have argued that Schick and McClennen’s arguments are not successful, yet 
                                                          
11 In addition to the philosophers here this appears to be the interpretation of the money-pump Hedden, 
Brian (2015). Options and Diachronic Tragedy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):423-451 
though Hedden argues that money-pump arguments are not successful, he agrees that this is how they 
should be understood.  
 
12 Schick, Frederic (1986). Dutch bookies and money pumps. Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):112-119 p117 
 
13 McClennen, Edward F. (1997). Pragmatic Rationality and Rules. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):210–
258. 
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they seem to agree on this framing of the money-pump argument. Rabinowicz and 
Dougherty agree that were Schick correct that an agent with cyclical preferences could 
avoid being turned into a money-pump by anticipating future offers and refusing to 
trades, the money-pump argument would fail to show that intransitive preferences are 
irrational; however, they argue that an otherwise rational agent with cyclical preferences 
would be forced to accept the trades either because backwards induction would compel 
an agent with cyclical preferences to take the trades,14 or because dominance reasoning 
compels the agent to take the trades regardless of how they anticipate acting in the 
future.15 
The important feature of this understanding of the argument is that it is because 
the agent has preferences that leave her exploitable that she is irrational.  
Against this interpretation, the second school understands the money pump 
argument as showing that the agent’s preferences violate the non-dominated choice 
principle: “A rational choice is one which selects an alternative to which none is 
preferred.”16 Understood this way the money pump argument looks like this:  
1. If an agent’s preferences are such that the agent cannot make a choice without 
violating the non-dominated choice principle then those preferences are irrational. 
2. If an agent’s preferences are such that they could be made to take a series of 
trades which leave them having lost money and better off in no respect, then that 
agent’s preferences are such that the agent cannot make a choice without violating 
the non-dominated choice principle. 
                                                          
14 Rabinowicz, W.: 2008, “Pragmatic Arguments for Rationality Constraints”, in: M.C. Galavotti, R. 
Scazzieri, and P. Suppes (eds.) Reasoning, Rationality, and Probability, Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp. 139-
163 
 
15 Dougherty, Tom (2014). A Deluxe Money Pump. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):21-29. 
 
16 This particular formation comes from Gustafsson, Johan E. (2013). The Irrelevance of the Diachronic 
Money-Pump Argument for Acyclicity. Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):460–464. But it can be found in more 
or less the same terms in Davidson et al. “Outlines of a formal theory of value, I” 145. 
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3. The agent S’s preferences are such that they could be made to take a series of 
trades which leave them having lost money and better off in no respect.  
4. Agent S’s preferences are irrational.  
 
Here, being vulnerable to a money pump does not itself make a preference 
ordering irrational, but is a symptom of a violation of the non-dominated choice 
principle, and it is the violation of this principle that makes the agent’s preferences 
irrational. This understanding of the money pump has recently been defended by Johan 
Gustafsson who suggests this is closer the original interpretation of the significance of the 
money pump argument given by Davidson et al.17 Gustafsson argues that if we follow 
this understanding of the money pump, many of the standard objections to the money 
pump can be obviated by a synchronic version of the argument.  
As with the traditional diachronic money pump, Johan Gustafsson’s synchronic 
money pump begins with an agent who has intransitive preferences, but in the synchronic 
version the agent is not offered any trades. Instead, the agent is given their choice of the 
options. In the case of Mr. S, imagine the department chair is less cynical and offers Mr. 
S whichever position he should like. Assuming Mr. S would prefer to have any of the 
offered positions to having none of them, Mr. S would then find himself in a pickle: Mr. 
S can’t rationally choose option a, because he prefers c to a, and he can’t rationally 
choose option c because he prefers b to c, nor can he choose option b because he prefers 
                                                          
17 Gustafsson, Johan E. (2013). The Irrelevance of the Diachronic Money-Pump Argument for 
Acyclicity. Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):460–464. This does seem to be closer to Davidson et al.’s 
intended argument. In discussing why Mr. S’s preferences are irrational they write “the obvious principle 
would appear to be this… a rational choice is one which selects an alternative to which none is preferred. 
But it is clear that the set of Mr. S's preferences makes a rational choice impossible, for whichever 
alternative he chooses there will be another alternative which is preferred to it. We may imagine a scene 
in which the point becomes obvious.” And which point they introduce the money pump. 
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a to b; because his preferences are intransitive, rational choice is impossible and hence, 
this set of preferences is irrational. This version of the money pump argument doesn’t 
rely on sequential choice, and therefore objections that appeal to foresight and resolute 
choices will be of no use.  
Though ultimately I will argue that the money pump argument fails under either 
interpretation, I find the second interpretation much more plausible than the first. I will 
shortly offer a criticism that strikes against both interpretations, but first I will give some 
considerations that suggest that we should prefer the second interpretation. 
 My preference for the second interpretation is motivated by an intuition 
concerning the following two sets of preferences: 
  Set One:  
1. Prefer full professor at a salary of 5,000 to associate professor 
at a salary of 5,500. 
2. Prefer associate professor at a salary of 5,500 to Assistant 
professor at a salary of 6,000. 
3. Prefer assistant professor at a salary of 6,000 to full professor 
at a salary of 5,000. 
Set Two:  
1. Prefer full professor at a salary of 5,000 to associate professor 
at a salary of 5,500. 
2. Prefer associate professor at a salary of 5,500 to Assistant 
professor at a salary of 6,000. 
3. Prefer assistant professor at a salary of 6,000 to full professor 
at a salary of 5,000. 
4. Prefer to never make more than two trades with the same 
person.18 
 
                                                          
18 I suspect many will want to say that this preference is irrational; however, it need not be. Perhaps the 
agent made a promise to his very conservative father that he would not make more than two trades. So 
although he himself does not have anything against trading, he prefers honoring the memory of his father 
to any benefit that might be secured by trading. Such a preference would, I take it, be abnormal, but 
could be subjectively rational.  
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My intuition about the above sets of preferences is that if Set One is irrational, so 
is Set Two, and if these preference sets are irrational, they are irrational for the same 
reason. However, if exploitability is what makes intransitive preferences irrational, an 
agent with Set Two preferences must not be irrational as an agent with Set Two 
preferences will not take enough trades to be exploited. 19  Therefore, the first 
interpretation of the money pump forces us to conclude that either Set One preferences 
are irrational while Set Two preferences are rational, or that if they are both irrational 
they are not irrational for the same reason. This is highly implausible.  
 With these two candidate interpretations of the money pump argument in place, I 
will now turn to my objections to both arguments.  
Objection One 
 The above discussion of the money-pump argument has centered on preferences 
over outcomes: the outcome of which job the subject will receive, but preferences do not 
necessarily concern outcomes; preferences can range over outcomes, actions, and 
alternative states of affairs. I have used the terminology of “acts, states, and outcomes” to 
mark an important departure I take from the decision theory of Leonard Savage. For 
Savage, preferences are exclusively over acts and outcomes and Savage is quite clear that 
he understands preferences as essentially tied to action. “I think it of great importance 
that preference, and indifference … be determined, at least in principle, by decisions 
between acts and not by response to introspective questions.”20 I depart from Savage in 
                                                          
19 At least not for that reason. 
20 Savage, Leonard J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley Publications in Statistics. 
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that I think preferences can range over more than just acts and outcomes. I can and often 
do have preferences over alternatives that I know couldn’t possibly be a consequence of 
my actions. I would prefer it if Heaven was for real which is to say that I prefer heaven 
existing to heaven not existing; however, I have no illusion that I could choose whether 
heaven existed or not, or that heaven’s existence could possibly be a consequence of my 
actions. This poses a problem for the money pump argument. I have already defined Set 
One and Set Two preferences, now let me introduce Set Three:  
Set Three:   
1. Prefer the Christian God existing to Zeus existing. 
2. Prefer Zeus existing to no God existing 
3. Prefer no God existing to the Christian God existing. 21 
 
Neither interpretation of the money-pump will apply to these intransitive 
preferences. I could not be offered a series of trades on the basis of these preferences that 
would leave me exploitable, and this includes Gustafsson’s synchronic money-pump as I 
could not possibly trade God’s existence for Zeus’s existence. This is a problem for the 
money-pump argument, because presumably if transitivity is a rational constraint on Set 
One and Set Two preferences, it is a constraint on Set Three preferences and 
presumably transitivity applies to Set One and Set Two and Set Three preferences for 
the same reason. Since the money-pump argument only applies to Set One and Set Two 
                                                          
21  I could just as comfortably used Jeffrey’s formulation of preferences for news items in which case the 
first preference of Set Three could be equivalently expressed as the preferring to receive the news that 
the Christian God exists the receiving the news that Zeus exists. Of course, I am assuming here that to 
have a preference is to have a particular kind of mental state—that is that preferences are in some sense 
psychologically real. This denies the behaviorist idea of preferences as revealed by behavior which Savage 
seems to indorse. Jeffrey, Richard (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press. p 83 
12 
 
it cannot be the reason that rational preferences must be transitive. Therefore the money-
pump argument fails.  
I have just concluded my first objection to the money-pump argument. I will now 
advance my second objection. 
Objection Two 
As I have already argued, the dispute between the first interpretation of the money 
pump argument and the second is on where to place the locus of irrationality. The first 
interpretation places the locus of blame on the exploitability of the agent who has 
intransitive preferences. The second sees the exploitability as merely a symptom of the 
true source of irrationality: the violation of the non-dominated choice principle. Here I 
will argue that both interpretations are mistaken as both place the locus of blame for the 
irrationality on the wrong kind of source—that is, neither the exploitability of the agent 
nor the violation of the non-dominated choice principle are the kinds of reasons for which 
an agent’s preferences can be irrational. To defend this conclusion I will repurpose 
Kavka’s famous toxin puzzle.22  
` In his now famous 1983 paper “The Toxin Puzzle” Gregory Kavka invites us to 
imagine ourselves in the following scenario:  
You have just been approached by an eccentric billionaire who has offered 
you the following deal. He places before you a vial of toxin that, if you drink it, 
will make you painfully ill for a day, but will not threaten your life or have any 
lasting effects…. The billionaire will pay you one million dollars tomorrow 
morning if, at midnight tonight, you intend to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon. 
He emphasizes that you need not drink the toxin to receive the money; in fact, the 
money will already be in your bank account hours before the time for drinking it 
arrives, if you succeed….. All you have to do is sign the agreement and then 
intend at midnight tonight to drink the stuff tomorrow afternoon. You are 
                                                          
22 Kavka, Gregory S. (1983). The Toxin Puzzle. Analysis 43 (1):33-36.  
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perfectly free to change your mind after receiving the money and not drink the 
toxin. (The presence or absence of the intention is to be determined by the latest 
'mind-reading' brain scanner and computing device designed by the great Doctor 
X. As a cognitive scientist, materialist, and faithful former student of Doctor X, 
you have no doubt that the machine will correctly detect the presence or absence 
of the relevant intention.) 
 
 Kavka suspects that a rational agent will not be able to form the intention to drink 
the toxin and this despite having a reason to form the intention to drink the toxin. If this is 
so, the agent will lose out on the million dollars. One might imagine someone criticizing 
the subject for failing to form the relevant intention and losing the money, but it seems 
that the subject would have a good defense against this criticism. The subject could argue 
“look, I know I had a reason to form the relevant intention, the trouble is, it’s not the 
right kind of reason for forming intentions, and hence it is not a reason for which the 
rationality of my intentions can be criticized.” 23 
 Now imagine the same situation as before, but for a minor difference: the subject 
is paid the million dollars not if they can form an intention to drink the toxin, but if, at 
midnight, they can prefer drinking the toxin to not drinking the toxin, tomorrow 
afternoon.  My suspicion is that this difference changes very little in the puzzle. One is 
not able to rationally prefer drinking the toxin tomorrow afternoon because one knows 
that by tomorrow morning, one will either have the million dollars or not. If one has the 
million dollars, they prefer not to drink the toxin. If they don’t have the million, they 
prefer not to drink the toxin. Hence, although one would certainly prefer to prefer to 
drink the toxin, one is unable to prefer drinking the toxin to not drinking the toxin. As 
                                                          
23 For an illuminating overview of the implications of the toxin puzzle see Mele, Alfred R. (1992). 
Intentions, reasons, and beliefs: Morals of the toxin puzzle. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):171 – 194. 
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before, one has a reason to form some attitude, this time a preference, yet one is unable to 
form this attitude, because one does not have the right kind of reason. 
 Suppose we changed the puzzle a little more. Suppose that instead of being 
positively rewarded for forming the right preference, the subject is to be negatively 
punished: if the subject is unable to form a preference for drinking the toxin tomorrow, 
they will suffer a swift kick in the gut. I suspect that this doesn’t significantly impact the 
rationality of forming a preference for drinking the toxin. The conclusion to draw from 
this is that just because having a certain preference leads to good or bad consequences is 
not a reason to think that a given preference is rational or irrational, because the 
consequences of the preferences are not the sort of reason for which one can form a 
preference.  
 Again we might imagine someone criticizing the subject for failing to form the 
relevant preference, but just as before, it seems perfectly appropriate to rejoin that just 
because having a preference leads to good or bad consequences is not itself a reason to 
have or not to have a preference, and hence it is not the kind of reason for which the 
subject’s rationality can be rightly criticized.  
This cuts directly against the first interpretation of the money pump argument. Recall 
that the first interpretation of the money pump argument looked like this:  
1. No rational set of preferences would lead an agent to take a series of trades that 
leaves her having lost money and better off in no respect.  
2. If an agent’s preferences are intransitive, then that agent could be made to take a 
series of trades which leave them having lost money and better off in no respect. 
3. So, intransitive preferences are irrational. 
But if what I have argued is correct, we have reason to be suspicious of premise one as 
premise one assumes that the negative consequences of a set of preferences can make a 
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set of preferences rational or irrational; however, the lesson of the toxin puzzle is that this 
is not the case.  
 Does the second interpretation of the money pump argument fare better?  Recall 
that the second interpretation went like this:  
1.  If an agent’s preferences are such that the agent cannot make a choice without 
violating the non-dominated choice principle then those preferences are irrational. 
2. If an agent’s preferences are such that they could be made to take a series of 
trades which leave them having lost money and better off in no other, then that 
agents preferences are such that the agent cannot make a choice without violating 
the non-dominated choice principle. 
3. The agent S’s preferences are such that they could be made to take a series of 
trades which leave them worse off in some respect and better off in no other.  
4. Agent S’s preferences are irrational.  
 
This version of the money pump argument does not assume that the loss of money is the 
locus of irrationality, but rather that intransitive preferences cause you to violate a 
principle of rational choice: the non-dominated choice principle, and this is why 
intransitive preferences are irrational. Is this enough to skirt my objection?  
 No. The violation of the non-dominated choice principle is just another kind of 
bad consequence. It is certainly nice to have preferences that permit a choice that does 
not violate the non-dominated choice principle, just as it is nice to have a million dollars, 
but just as a million dollars is not itself a reason to change one’s preferences, not 
violating the non-dominated choice principle is not itself a reason to change one’s 
preferences.  
 Suppose that instead of taking advantage of Mr. S, the department chair pointed 
out that Mr. S’s preferences precluded rational choice because they caused him to violate 
the non-dominated choice principle no matter what he chooses. It seems Mr S. could 
reasonably respond “I understand that in light of my preferences I cannot choose an 
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option to which none is preferred, but that is not itself a reason to think that my 
preferences are irrational. Perhaps, in light of what I value, there is no best option. Why is 
that irrational? Additionally, I cannot simply decide to prefer option a to option c so that 
my preferences straighten out, I don’t prefer option a to option c because I think 
difference in salary is sufficiently great so as to outweigh the difference in rank. 
Similarly, I have reasons for all of my preferences.”  
  Both accounts of the money pump argument fail and they fail for the same reason: 
both identify the wrong kind of reason as the locus of irrationality for intransitive 
preferences. Therefore, if intransitive preferences are irrational it is not for concerns of 
money-pumps or violations of non-dominated choice principles. Why then, should we 
believe intransitive preferences are necessarily irrational? Why posit a principle like 
transitivity in the first place?  
 Although I do not find the semantic argument or the two interpretations of the 
money-pump argument to be sound, I do not think the failures of these arguments should 
make us completely agnostic about whether or not strict preference is a transitive relation. 
One reason for thinking that ‘preferred to’ is a transitive relation is that it is intuitive, it 
just seems right. Furthermore I think there is room for a third interpretation of the money-
pump which suggests intransitive preferences are irrational. This interpretation is as 
follows:  
1. Intransitive preferences can sometimes make a person into a money pump.  
2. Money-pump behavior does not seem like the kind of activity rational people 
would engage in. 
3. So intransitive preferences are likely irrational.  
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This version of the money-pump is not sensitive to the objections I have raised as 
it does not posit that intransitive preferences are irrational for the reason that they leave 
subjects exploitable. Instead this version suggests that the money-pump-exploitability is 
evidence that there is something irrational in having intransitive preferences. This version 
of the money-pump does not offer a reason why intransitive preferences are irrational, it 
merely argues that intransitive preferences are irrational. Ultimately to make this 
argument prove that intransitive preferences are irrational we would have to demonstrate 
that there is no rational ranking of alternatives in terms of preference that is intransitive. 
However, even if this argument is not a proof, surely it is evidence that intransitive 
preferences are irrational.  
I think that the strength of the money pump is that it shows that intransitive 
preferences can sometimes lead to behavior that seems manifestly irrational. While this 
behavior is not itself the reason that intransitive preferences are irrational, it is a reason to 
think that intransitive preferences are irrational. Therefore, if there are no compelling 
objections to transitivity—no reasons to think intransitive preferences can be rational we 
should trust transitivity. However, there are numerous arguments that have purported to 
show that rational preferences can be intransitive.24 The bulk of the remainder of this 
                                                          
24 I will not be able to address all of the important counterexamples to transitivity that have been argued 
for in the literature. The two most important arguments I will not be addressing are Larry Temkin’s 
continuum argument for the intransitivity of ‘all things considered better than’ which he argues for in 
Temkin, Larry S. (1996). A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 
(3):175–210. for important criticisms of Temkin’s arguments I recommend Voorhoeve’s review of Temkin 
book Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning in Voorhoeve, Alex (2013). 
Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity. Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):409-425. Stuart 
Rachels has also argued both for the intransitivity of ‘better than’ and ‘preferred to’ along similar lines as 
Temkin. I would suggest Rachels, Stuart (2005). Counterexamples to the Transitivity of 'Better Than'. In 
Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 249—
263 as a good place to start.  
18 
 
thesis will be dedicated to showing that two important putative counterexamples to 
transitivity fail to substantiate their conclusion, and I will turn to this task in the following 
two sections.  However, before turning to these putative counterexamples I will spend the 
remainder of this section explaining what I take the right kind of reasons for which 
preferences can be irrational. I turn to this discussion presently.  
The Right Kind of Reasons 
 I have argued that one reason the money pump argument fails is that it places the 
locus of rationality on the wrong kind of reasons for preferences. Here I sketch what I 
take the right kinds of reasons to be, and hence, the right kinds of reasons for which 
intransitive preferences are irrational.  
The first distinction I would like to suggest is between being mistaken about one’s 
preferences, one’s preferences being mistaken, and one’s preferences being irrational. To 
motivate this distinction consider the following case: 
 The Restaurant Case: 
 
Alice is visiting friends in a town she has not visited in quite some time. 
She and her friends have elected to go to a local Mexican food restaurant for 
lunch. Alice remembers dining at this restaurant once before and she remembers 
quite clearly that she did not enjoy her meal. She does not remember, however, 
what she ordered, she only remembers that it was most unpalatable. Alice also 
recalls that the meal her companion ordered last time looked quite delicious. She 
does not recall, however, what her friend ordered. Alice would prefer ordering 
what her friend ordered last time to ordering what she ordered before. Alice looks 
over the menu which has two options Combo #1 and Combo #2. She reads over 
the description of both combos and decides for good reasons that her friend 
definitely ordered Combo #2. When the waitress arrives and asks for her order 
Alice orders Combo #2. Some time passes and the waitress brings Alice Combo 
#2 as she ordered and Alice instantly recognizes Combo #2 as what she ordered 
last time.  
 
19 
 
My intuition about this case is that although the waitress did bring Alice what she 
ordered, she did not bring Alice what she preferred. Alice was mistaken about her 
preferences. She thought she preferred Combo #2 to Combo #1 when in fact she 
preferred just the opposite.  
 Compare the restaurant case to the following:  
The Genie Case:  
Stephany was walking along the beach when a peculiar glimmer caught 
her eye. Upon investigating, Stephany discovered a magic lantern out of which 
sprung a magic genie. Naturally, Stephany was quite excited and asked the genie 
if she would be allowed to wish for whatever she desired. The genie, of course, 
rolled his eyes frustrated with the misinformation about his kind propagated by 
children’s stories. “No” the genie corrected, “we don’t do that, we’ve never done 
that, you get to choose between the same two options everyone else does: would 
you like a million dollars or ten thousand dollars?” Stephany considers her 
options carefully and decides to choose the million dollars over the ten thousand 
reasoning that she prefers the option with the greater amount of money. The 
genie, surprised, gives Stephany her million dollars and remarks “I would have 
thought you would have chosen the option that would have brought you the most 
happiness” before disappearing back into the lantern.  
 
I have two intuitions about this case. First, that, unlike the restaurant case, the 
genie did give Stephany what she preferred: the million dollars. Second, on the 
assumption that Stephany only cares about money in so far as she thinks money will 
make her happy, and that the genie is correct and the ten thousand dollars would bring 
Stephany more happiness in her life, her preferences were mistaken. Her preferences 
were mistaken because given what she values, she did not prefer the best option.  
The first point I would like to make in light of the restaurant case and the genie 
case is that only preferences that are in some way mistaken can be irrational. The second 
point is that not all preferences that are mistaken need be irrational. Arguably, in light of 
the evidence Stephany had available to her, it was rational for her to prefer the million 
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dollars to the ten thousand dollars. This leaves two final questions: When are mistaken 
preferences irrational? Why are intransitive preferences necessarily irrational?  
Our preferences follow from two more basic features of our psychology: our 
desires and our beliefs. By desires I mean the things we fine to be worthwhile or 
valuable, and sometimes I will use the word ‘value’ in place of ‘desire’; these need not be 
the same for everyone, but the standard list tends to include things like pleasure, love, 
friendship, autonomy, truth, and knowledge. There may or may not be external rational 
constraints on what an agent desires—that is, there may not be a list of things the agent 
must value in order to count as rational—I need not take a side on this issue for my 
arguments to go through. Though an agent may find two things to be intrinsically 
desirable, for instance love and knowledge, she need not desire them equally to be 
rational. Perhaps she values love and knowledge intrinsically, she may desire love more 
than knowledge and if presented with her choice between a life which exemplifies love 
and one that exemplifies knowledge, she may rationally desire the life of love more than 
the life of knowledge. In addition to desires, there are beliefs. The beliefs I have in mind 
here are the beliefs about what the options are how the various options under 
consideration will satisfy or dissatisfy our desires.  
For an example of how desires and beliefs come together to form preferences, 
consider an agent who prefers pie A to pie B. This preference follows from two 
considerations. One, she desires pleasure. Two she believe that apple pies are better 
tasting than blueberry pies (and hence more pleasurable to eat) and she believes that pie 
A is an apple pie and Pie B is a blueberry pie. My assumption is that all preferences will 
have a similar relationship between beliefs and desires.  
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We now have the appropriate tools to answer the questions with which this talk of 
desires and preferences began: in light of what are preferences rational or irrational? 
Irrational preferences are not irrational because they lead to bad consequences, contrary 
to what the money-pump argument has supposed, but because they are the product of 
inconsistent or incoherent evaluations of options which arise from either incoherent 
desires or incoherent beliefs. 
Why are intransitive preferences necessarily irrational? Intransitive preferences 
are irrational because they are the result of inconsistent evaluations of alternatives- that 
is, no consistent evaluations of alternatives could result in an intransitive preference 
ordering. My suspicion is that this could be proven with a formal model, but I confess 
that I don’t, as of yet, have such a model to give. Instead, for the remainder of this thesis I 
will look at some influential putative counterexamples to transitivity and argue that they 
are not successful. If the best cases for rational intransitive preferences fail, either 
because it can be shown the agent is not evaluating their options in light of their desires 
and beliefs consistently or that the situation giving rise to the counterexample is 
impossible, then we will have good reason to suppose that intransitive preferences are 
irrational. In the following sections I will address putative counterexamples of 
intransitivity.  
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SECTION TWO 
In the previous section I argued that the standard argument against the rationality 
of intransitive preferences fails because it attends to the wrong kind of reasons for 
evaluating preferences. Preferences are not irrational because they lead to bad 
consequences, they are irrational in so far as they are the result of some inconsistency or 
mistake in the evaluation of alternatives in light of the agent’s desires and beliefs. If we 
are to maintain the intuitive conclusion that intransitive preferences are irrational in the 
face of putative counterexamples we need arguments that focus on these evaluations.   
In the following two sections I will look at a two arguments that have purported to 
show that rational preferences, preferences that follow from a reasonable and consistent 
evaluation of alternatives in light of desires and beliefs, can be intransitive. These 
arguments can be broken up into two distinct strategies. One strategy involves a sort of 
continuum argument, presenting a series of alternatives with very slight differences 
between consecutive alternatives which culminate with vastly distinct endpoints and then 
arguing that a rational agent’s preferences over these alternatives might rationally be 
intransitive. Warren Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer uses a variation of this strategy, 
and will be discussed in this section. The second strategy involves evaluating alternatives 
along a plurality of values and desires. This strategy elicits an apparently rational 
intransitive preference ordering amongst options which are so different that they cannot 
all be judged along the same values. I will address this strategy in the next section. I will 
tackle both strategies separately as I believe they require different treatments, beginning 
with the first strategy. I will start my analysis of the first strategy by presenting Quinn’s 
puzzle of the self-torturer.  
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Quinn and the Puzzle of the Self Torturer  
Warren Quinn’s famous puzzle of the self-torturer has been a persistent challenge 
to transitivity, and has sparked a heated debate in the literature. I will primarily focus on 
Quinn’s original argument using the more recent discussion to clarify the problem raised 
by Quinn and evaluate purported solutions. In his 1990 paper “The Puzzle of the Self-
Torturer”25 Quinn invites us to imagine a medical device, with settings ranging from 0 to 
1000, capable of administering an electric current to the body in very precise increments; 
so precise, in fact, that the difference in electrical current between any two adjacent 
settings is so slight that adjacent settings feel no different—at setting 1, the amount of 
electricity in your body is so minute that it feels no different from setting 0 at which 
there is no current at all.   
  Now imagine an agent, whom Quinn pessimistically dubs “the self-torturer”, 
agrees to have the device attached to him permanently. He begins at setting 0 and every 
week he is given the option to either advance a setting or to remain at his current setting. 
He is given a trial period at the start of each week to experiment with different settings 
before the device resets to its previous setting. Should he advance a setting, he will be 
paid a sum of 10,000 dollars. However, he can never go back a setting once he has 
advanced, and he cannot advance more than one setting a week.  
 Although the self-torturer finds himself in unusual circumstances, he is 
otherwise really very much like us. The self-torturer values money and disvalues pain, 
                                                          
25 Quinn, Warren S. (1990). The puzzle of the self-torturer. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):79-90 
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and although there are some amounts of pain he would tolerate for large amounts of 
money, there is no amount of money that would make a life of agony preferable.  
 In light of these values, the self-torturer prefers setting 1 to setting 0 because 
setting 1 is worth an additional 10,000 dollars but feels no more painful than setting 0. 
The self-torturer prefers setting 2 to setting 1 for the same reason, as with setting 3 to 
setting 2, setting 4 to setting 3 … and setting 1000 to setting 999. However, while the 
difference in electrical current between adjacent settings is slight enough that the self-
torturer cannot feel the difference, setting 1000 and setting 0 are sufficiently far apart 
that the self-torturer can feel the difference—where setting 0 is pain free, setting 1000 is 
intolerable. Because the self-torturer prefers a life of penury to a life of agony, the self-
torturer prefers setting 0 to setting 1000 and would even trade the fortune he has amassed 
to return to setting 0. Quinn suspects that although the agent’s preferences are clearly 
intransitive, it is not at all clear that the agent is irrational and hence we are left with a 
puzzle.26  
In this section I will argue that Quinn’s puzzle is not a genuine counterexample 
to transitivity. I will argue that there are three options in responding to the puzzle and the 
most plausible of which involves denying that Quinn’s puzzle is coherent; however 
before I discuss what these options are and which option ought to preferred, I wish to 
                                                          
26 It’s worth noting that the Self-torturer’s preferences aren’t merely intransitive, they are cyclical and 
hence are prime candidates for a money pump argument, though virtually no one argues on the basis of 
the money-pump that the self-torturer is irrational. I take this to be further evidence that the money-
pump is not a convincing argument when the values and beliefs of the agent are known and seem 
rational. Frank Arntzenius and David McCarthy are a potential exception, arguing “One indication that 
there is something wrong with Harry’s reasoning is this: he can be turned into a money pump in a way he 
could easily foresee. . . . This makes it even clearer that there is a real problem about his sequence of 
apparently rational decisions.” Arntzenius, Frank, and David McCarthy. "Self Torturer and Group 
Beneficence." Erkenntnis 47, no. 1 (1997): 129-44 
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clarify exactly what the counterexample to transitivity is, and how Quinn’s puzzle is 
supposed to work. I will present two alternative interpretations of the puzzle, and argue 
that only one poses a genuine counterexample to transitivity.  
Two Alternative Interpretations  
Quinn claims that the self-torturer “cannot feel any difference in comfort between 
adjacent settings,” but this could mean one of two things. It could mean that adjacent 
settings feel no different— adjacent settings feel the same— or it could mean that while 
adjacent settings do feel different, this difference is so slight that the self-torturer doesn’t, 
or can’t, notice the difference—adjacent settings are indiscriminable.  
Quinn offers some clarification of his puzzle in responding to three anticipated 
objections regarding the phenomenal difference between consecutive settings. The first 
objection is that we might be able to discern a difference in comfort between adjacent 
settings by attending to behavioral evidence. Perhaps the self-torturer cannot introspect a 
difference between adjacent settings, but there might be other evidence: the self-torturer 
might be more irritable at the later setting, or look more uncomfortable.27 The second 
objection is that the self-torturer may be able to discern a difference between adjacent 
settings by triangulating with some third setting. Setting 1 may be indiscernible from 
                                                          
27 Alex Voorhoeve and Ken Binmore have pushed a version of this objection. Imagine the self-torturer is 
experimenting with different settings recording whether or not the settings feels comfortable with 
reports like “very comfortable” “slightly uncomfortable” or “very uncomfortable”. The self-torturer might 
be able to discern a difference between consecutive settings by attending to the discrepancies between 
reports. If setting S is described as “very uncomfortable” 49 percent of the time when following setting 0 
and setting S + 1 is described as “very uncomfortable” 51 percent of the time when following setting 0, 
then the self-torturer has evidence that setting S+1 is slightly more painful than setting S. Voorhoeve, Alex 
& Binmore, Ken (2006). Transitivity, the Sorites Paradox, and Similarity-based Decision-
making. Erkenntnis 64 (1):101-114  
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setting 2 and setting 2 from setting 3, but if setting 1 is discernibly different from setting 
3 then there must be some difference in how setting 2 and setting 3 feel. Thus the self-
torturer has reason to think that his comfort does decline in moving from setting 2 to 
setting 3.28 
 Quinn counters that although triangulation and behavioral evidence might be 
sufficient to detect the phenomenal differences between very similar stimuli, he is 
imagining a case in which the objects of comparison are so similar that there is no 
phenomenal difference detectible by introspection, triangulation, or behavioral evidence. 
Quinn writes:  
If there are increments of voltage just small enough to be directly 
undetectable, it seems there might be even smaller increments that cannot be 
detected by triangulation. And I want such a case. . . . What naturally matters [to 
the self-torturer] is that the comfort status of s and s+1 are, introspectively and 
behaviorally, no different – either in direct comparison to each other or in oblique 
consideration with any third setting. It is enough for him that the empirical data 
give him no reason to suppose that his comfort declines either directly or relative 
to some fixed point, in any step.29 
 
 Although these passages clarify that Quinn has in mind a case in which adjacent 
settings are indiscriminable, it is still open for interpretation whether or not the adjacent 
settings feel the same.  
                                                          
28 Quinn p.81 Donald Regan develops this triangulation objection more fully in Regan, D.: 2000, 'Perceiving 
Imperceptible Harms: With Other Thoughts on Transitivity, Cumulative Effects, and Consequentialism', in 
M. Almeida (ed.), Imperceptible Harms and Benefits, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 49-73. 
Erik Carlson has also pushed Quinn on this point arguing that it is impossible that settings 1000 and 
settings 1 are perceptually distinguishable while there is no phenomenal difference detectible by 
triangulation. I won’t review these arguments here as nothing in my objections to Quinn rest on this 
point. Carlson, Erik. "Cyclical Preferences and Rational Choice." Theoria 62 (1996): 144-60. Especially 
pages 152-154.  
 
29 Quinn 83 
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 We are left then with two alternative interpretations of the puzzle. On one 
interpretation, although there may be slight differences in how some of the adjacent 
settings feel, this difference is so slight that the self-torturer does not notice this 
difference.30 On the other, adjacent settings are pairwise indiscriminable because the 
difference in electricity between adjacent settings is so slight that adjacent settings feel 
the same. I think the second nterpretation alone presents a plausible counterexample to 
transitivity, but I will briefly consider and reject the first interpretation.  
The First Interpretation  
Discriminability has to do with the agent’s ability to tell the difference between 
the relevant objects or experiences. Often, two experiences are indiscriminable in some 
relevant respect because these experiences look or feel the same; however these can 
come apart. Suppose that setting 1 does feel slightly different than setting 0, it could still 
be the case that setting 1 and setting 0 are indiscriminable.  Perhaps this is due to the 
self-torturer’s imperfect memory – the self-torturer never feels setting 1 and setting 0 at 
the same time, so when the self-torturer compares setting 1 and setting 0 he has to rely 
on his memory. If the self-torturer’s memory is sufficiently limited he may simply forget 
                                                          
30 Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman have defended a version of the self-torturer puzzle in which it is 
not assumed that adjacent settings feel the same. They argue that “the puzzle doesn’t require adjacent 
settings of the dial to be indiscriminable. It seems equally rational to prefer large sums of money over 
nearly imperceptible, or even just slight, differences in pain, and yet prefer abject poverty over sustained 
agony; again, these seem to be the preferences of most ordinary agents.” It is not clear, that this is right. 
By hypothesis there are certain amounts of pain that the self-torture would prefer to avoid at any 
monetary cost. Presumably, then, the self-torturer would not prefer to advance to setting that had that 
amount of pain, even if it is only slightly different then the setting he is currently at, for any amount of 
money. Tenenbaum, Sergio & Raffman, Diana (2012). Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-
Torturer. Ethics 123 (1):86-112. 
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the slight difference in how the earlier setting felt. 31 If memory is not the issue, perhaps 
the self-torturer just doesn’t notice the difference in how setting 1 and setting 0 feel 
because the difference are really quite small. To make the difference between feeling the 
same and being indiscriminably different salient, we could suppose that some warlock 
snuck into the self-torturer’s bedroom at night, stole his arm, and planted false memories 
that he had never had a right arm to begin with. I imagine that although in the morning 
the self-torturer would not be able to discriminate any difference from the way he was 
the night before, he would in fact feel different. This would be an instance in which there 
is a relevant phenomenal difference between two phenomenal states but one that is 
indiscriminable.  
 This distinction is relevant, as presumably the self-torturer cares about how 
different settings feel, and only cares about his ability to discern the differences between 
adjacent settings in so far as this is his means for determining whether adjacent settings 
feel the same. If this is so, then Quinn might need something stronger than mere 
indiscriminability to generate the intransitive preference orderings.  
  One could, under the first interpretation, develop an argument against transitivity 
along the following lines: Though there are in fact slight differences in comfort between 
some adjacent settings, the self-torturer cannot detect a difference, in any way, between 
adjacent settings. It seems to him that adjacent settings feel the same. Hence the self-
                                                          
31 Alex Voorhoeve and Ken Binmore have given a version of this argument “it is conceivable that when 
Alice is presented with two similar stimuli in succession, in her memory the first stimulus always becomes 
assimilated to the second, so that she finds them introspectively indistinguishable.” Sergio Tenenbaum 
and Diana Raffman dispute this point in footnote 17 of Tenenbaum, Sergio & Raffman, Diana (2012). 
Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. Ethics 123 (1):86-112. 
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torturer rationally comes to believe that should he advance a setting, his comfort will not 
decline, and he will be paid handsomely for the advance. Such a belief is in perfect 
accordance with his evidence. Therefore he rationally forms a preference on the basis of 
this belief to advance to the next setting. This reasoning will apply to all adjacent 
settings, so the self-torturer will soon find himself at setting 1000, but setting 1000 is 
tortuous and he can certainly feel the difference between setting 0 and setting 1000 and 
will gladly give up his fortune to return to setting 0, which he prefers to setting 1000. 
The self-torturer’s preferences are intransitive, but perfectly rational, given his evidence.  
 I have two objections to this formulation of the self-torturer argument. The first is 
that it is not clear that the self-torturer genuinely prefers to advance at each step. The 
second is that on the assumption that the self-torture is not mistaken about his 
preferences it is not clear that his preferences are rational as the beliefs generating this 
preference ordering is incoherent. I will begin with the first objection.  
I think that in this interpretation of the puzzle, the self-torturer is mistaken about 
his preferences for at least one advance. Recall that to be mistaken about one’s 
preference is to think that one’s preferences are other than they in fact are. In my 
restaurant example, Alice thought that she preferred Combo #2 to Combo #1 but she 
was mistaken about this, because what she thought to be Combo #2 was in fact Combo 
#1. I think the self-torturer is similarly mistaken for at least one pair of settings. Ex-
hypothesi at least one of the settings, setting 1000, is so painful that no amount of money 
could compensate for a life at that setting. It follows that there are some settings for 
which no amount of money can compensate, call these the intolerable settings. So, 
assuming that there are slight differences in how adjacent settings feel (as this 
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interpretation assumes) there is a setting for which the advance to the next setting is not 
worth the 10,000 dollars—the setting which takes the self-torturer from a tolerable 
setting to one of the intolerable settings.32 For convenience I will suppose that these 
settings are setting 900 and setting 901 where setting 901 is the first intolerable setting.  
 Now under this formulation of first interpretation, the self-torturer arrives at 
setting 900. As he has done before, he experiments with setting 901 to see if he can 
discern any difference between this setting and setting 900 and just as before, he finds 
any difference between these settings to be indiscriminable. He takes the fact that he 
can’t discriminate a difference to be good evidence that there is no difference and 
concludes that setting 901 feels the same as setting 900. He then comes to believe that 
should he advance he would be at a setting which feels the same as his current setting, 
but receive an additional 10,000 dollars. He decides to advance.  
 The question to ask is whether the self-torturer genuinely preferred to advance to 
setting 901 or did he merely think he preferred to advance? Given the structural 
similarity to the restaurant case I gave in the previous section, it is plausible that the self-
torturer did not genuinely prefer to advance. The self-torturer thought he preferred to 
advance to setting 901 because he prefers a setting which feels the same as setting 900 
but worth 10,000 more, and he thought setting 901 was one such setting. However, the 
self-torturer is mistaken about this, and setting 901 is not the setting he prefers, because 
                                                          
32 Duncan MacIntosh gives a variant of this argument in MacIntosh, Duncan (2010). Intransitive 
Preferences, Vagueness, and the Structure of Procrastination. In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White 
(eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press. Here he argues that the self-torturer could begin at 
1000 which is intolerable and scroll back the settings until he finds the first tolerable setting.  
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setting 901 feels differently than setting 900 and the difference is not worth 10,000 
dollars. This concludes my first objection to this interpretation.  
 My second objection is that on the assumption he genuinely prefers to advance 
all the way to 1000 only to prefer 0 to 1000, it is not clear that his preferences are 
rational. My first objection grants the assumption that the belief of the self-torturer that 
consecutive settings feel the same was rational given the pairwise indiscriminability. My 
second objection questions this assumption.  
 The reason I am suspicious of the rationality of the self-torturer’s belief is that I 
doubt it is coherent to believe that each setting feels the same as the setting before it 
while also believing that the last setting is more painful than the first setting. The 
argument against transitivity from the first interpretation takes as a premise that the 
indiscriminability of the differences between settings gives the self-torture evidence that 
consecutive settings feel the same as each other, but the fact that the self-torturer begins 
to feel pain in later settings constitutes good evidence that consecutive settings do not 
feel the same. Where, after all, is all of this pain coming from? This objection is tied to 
whether or not it is possible to experience phenomenal continuum in which ‘looks the 
same as’ is not transitive. As this objection will stand or fall on the success of my 
objections to the second interpretation I will leave this consideration here for now.  
 The first interpretation fails because it is not rational for the self-torturer to prefer 
settings for the fact that they are indiscriminably different as the self-torturer only cares 
about how settings feel. Furthermore even if the self-torturer rationally takes the 
indiscriminability of setting pairs as evidence that consecutive pairs feel the same this 
does not generate an intransitive preference ordering, as this merely leads the self-
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torturer to be mistaken about his preferences. And finally the beliefs generating these 
preferences may not be coherent in the first place. In either case, the self-torturer’s actual 
preferences will be transitive or he will be irrational, and therefore this interpretation of 
Quinn’s puzzle is no threat to transitivity.  
 The Second Interpretation and the Phenomenal Sorites  
The first interpretation will not generate a counterexample to transitivity for the 
reasons I have argued; however these arguments will not apply to the second 
interpretation under which adjacent settings are indiscriminable because they actually 
feel the same. This interpretation would need to invoke the kind of phenomenal 
continuum presumed in phenomenal sorites arguments. 
There are three options for responding to the second interpretation of Quinn’s 
puzzle: One, we could accept the counterintuitive conclusion that intransitive preferences 
can be rational. Two, we could argue that although it seems as if the agent is evaluating 
his options rationally when forming his preferences, we are mistaken in this, the agent is 
actually irrational (this is option I took in responding to the first interpretation). Three, 
we could deny that the puzzle Quinn has presented is logically possible—deny that there 
could be a device where all adjacent settings feel the same, but the first setting feels 
different from the last. Ultimately I will argue that the third avenue is the route we 
should take, however I will first consider the second avenue and argue that it is not a 
plausible way out of this interpretation of the puzzle.  
 If we are to take the second avenue, we must somehow argue that contrary to 
appearances, the self-torturer is not rational. This would amount to showing that either 
the self-torturer’s desires or values are incoherent or the self-torturer is operating under 
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false beliefs as these are the reasons for which preferences can be rational or irrational. 
What are the relevant desires? The self-torturer’s desires are for more money and less 
pain all else being equal and to avoid a life of agony at any financial cost. What are the 
beliefs? The self-torturer believes that his comfort does not decline in moving from one 
setting to the next adjacent setting and that he will be paid ten thousand dollars for each 
advance. These beliefs in conjunction with the self-torturer’s desires give rise to the 
cyclical preferences. Where might the irrationality be? The desires seem 
straightforwardly rational. There doesn’t seem to be anything irrational in desiring more 
money all things being equal, and it doesn’t seem to be anything irrational in desiring 
less pain either. Perhaps, then, the self-torturer’s beliefs are the problem; after all, how 
can it be that the self-torturer’s comfort does not decline in any advancement from one 
setting to the next and yet the he begins in relative comfort and ends up in sheer agony? 
If Quinn’s puzzle is coherent, then there is no phenomenal difference between 
adjacent settings, and since comfort is purely a matter of how things feel, the self-
torturer’s comfort really does not decline in any step. Therefore, so long as the self-
torturer really is be paid for his advances, the self-torturer’s beliefs seem rational.  
The second avenue for making sense of Quinn’s puzzle is a dead end, so long as 
everything Quinn has told us is correct, the self-torturer is rational in forming his 
intransitive preferences. Thus if rational preferences are necessarily transitive it must be 
the case that not everything Quinn has told us is correct. This takes us to the third avenue 
for which I will argue presently.  
 The third avenue for interpreting Quinn’s puzzle is to deny that the situation 
generating the puzzle is possible. Specifically I will argue that the phenomenal 
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continuum that Quinn is presupposing is logically impossible because ‘looks the same as’ 
is a transitive relation. The argument I will be advancing against the possibility of 
Quinn’s continuum is borrowed from Delia Graff-Fara and her 2001 paper Phenomenal 
Continua and the Sorites.33 I will first present her argument and show why it is a problem 
for Quinn’s puzzle. I will then consider some recent objections to Fara’s arguments, and 
defend Fara’s account against these objections. I will now turn to Fara’s argument.  
Fara’s Argument for the Transitivity of ‘Feels the Same As’ 
Quinn is committed to denying the transitivity of ‘feels the same as’, otherwise 
his puzzle will be incoherent: If ‘feels the same as’ is transitive then we could reason as 
follows: setting 0 is pain free and setting 1 feels the same as setting 0 setting 1 must be 
pain free. Likewise if setting 1 is pain free and setting 2 feels the same as setting 1 then 
setting 2 must be pain free. Likewise … setting 1000 must be pain free, but by hypothesis 
setting 100 is tortuous, so it must be that ‘feels the same as’ is intransitive. 
Fara’s argument against the possibility of the kind of phenomenal continuum 
Quinn is imagining is developed within the context of the phenomenal sorites puzzle. The 
logical form of the phenomenal sorites puzzle looks something like this:34  
PHENOMENAL SORITES ARGUMENT: 
Premise 1: Fa1   
Premise 2: If Ryx then if Fx, Fy  
Premise 3: there is a series a1 …an such that Rai+1ai for all i.   
Conclusion: Fan.  
 
                                                          
33 Fara, Delia Graff (2001). Phenomenal continua and the sorites. Mind 110 (440):905-935 
 
34 I am borrowing this formulation of the puzzle from Keefe, Rosanna (2011). Phenomenal Sorites 
Paradoxes and Looking the Same. Dialectica 65 (3):327-344. 
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If I were to derive a sorites argument from Quinn’s example, F would stand for the 
property ‘feels comfortable’ and Ryx would stand for the relation ‘feels the same as’35. 
The series a1 … an would be the consecutive settings with the corresponding electrical 
voltage.  
Given a phenomenal continuum such as the gradual rise of pain in Quinn’s 
example or the more traditional example of a series of color patches gradually moving 
from red to yellow, premises one through three all appear to be true, but, supposing that 
n is a suitably large number, the conclusion is false. As the only inferences are modus 
ponens, and the conclusion is obviously false, there remains only one way out of the 
puzzle: we have to deny a premise.36  
The traditional route has been to deny the second premise which amounts to 
denying the transitivity of the ‘looks the same as’ relation, and this appears to be the 
option Quinn has taken; however, Fara’s strategy is to first push the plausibility of the 
second premise, that ‘looks the same as’ really is a transitive relation, and then undercut 
the motivation both for thinking that the third premise is true (that we do experience 
sorites-style phenomenal continua) and for rejecting the transitivity of ‘looks the same 
as’. If Fara’s argument is successful then Quinn’s puzzle is impossible as there will have 
                                                          
35 Because Quinn is using electrical current and pain, the R stands for the “feels the same as” relation, but 
of course this is not meant to suggest that sorites puzzles always concern pain. The typical relation would 
be “looks the same as”, but it is equally possible to have a sorites puzzle involving the “sounds the same 
as” relation or any other sense modality.  
 
36 This isn’t exactly right. There are responses to the sorites puzzle that do not involve denying a 
premise— one could deny that logic even applied to sorites paradoxes; Frege, Russell and Quine all 
pushed some version of this thesis, but denying a premise is the most common route and it is the one I 
will focus on in this paper. Hyde, Dominic, "Sorites Paradox", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/sorites-paradox/>. 
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to be a perceptible difference between at least one pair of adjacent settings and an 
intransitive preference ordering will not be generated.  
Fara’s argument in support of the transitivity of ‘looks the same as’ relations is so 
simple it is hard to frame it in a way that does not look question begging. Fara’s 
argument is that if ‘looks the same as’ is not a transitive relation, the same-appearance 
claims of the form “if one paint patch looks the same as another then if one looks red, so 
does the other” are not true, but they are true, so looks the same as is transitive. This is 
likely to appear question begging because the very reason we denied transitivity in the 
first place is that we had to deny the truth of these same-appearance claims to avoid the 
paradoxical conclusions of the sorites puzzle. All the same, Fara’s argument is not 
question begging when taken in light of her overall strategy. Fara is trying to evaluate, in 
light of the sorites puzzle, which is really the most plausible premise to deny, the truth of 
the same-appearance claims or the existence of the phenomenal continua. At this stage in 
her argument she is merely stressing the intuitive appeal of same-appearance claims. 
After all, imagine the self-torturer were to say ‘Setting 10 feels the same as setting 11, 
but setting 11 feels painful but setting 10 does not.’ Could we even make sense of that? 
The same-appearance claims Fara is defending don’t merely seem true, they seem 
trivially true—its truth seems to follow from the meaning of the terms used in the claim. 
Given that two objects look the same it is hard to see how they could differ in any 
respect relevant for the applicability of the predicate “feels painful”.  
There are two considerations motivating the traditional move of rejection of the 
second premise over the third. The first is that we do seem to have phenomenal continua 
of the sort Quinn is imagining. Consider a bucket of red paint. It seems entirely plausible 
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that if a single drop of yellow paint was mixed into the bucket, the paint would look to be 
the same color. Similarly for the next drop, and the next, until the bucket looked yellow. 
Because these experiences seem perfectly possible, ‘looks the same as’ must not be 
transitive.  
The second consideration is that a similar move is taken in escaping the original 
non-phenomenal sorites paradox. In the non-phenomenal sorites paradox our premises 
look just the same:  
NON-PHENOMENAL SORITES ARGUMENT: 
Premise 1: Fa1   
Premise 2: If Ryx then if Fx, Fy  
Premise 3: there is a series a1 …an such that Rai+1ai for all i.   
Conclusion: Fan.  
 
Except here, F will stand for a non-phenomenal predicate like ‘is tall’ and a1 will 
be a seven foot tall man, an will be some four foot tall man, and R will stand for ‘is one-
hundredth of an inch shorter than.’37  
Here it seems perfectly appropriate to deny the second premise and absurd to 
deny the third.38 Denying the third would amount to saying that there could never be a 
series of men each, one hundredth of an inch shorter than the last, but clearly this is 
possible. 
Fara’s argument against the second consideration is fairly straightforward. The 
difference of a hundredth of an inch is relevant to the applicability of “tall”. But in the 
                                                          
37 Notice that in this sorites paradox, nothing treads on how tall the man appears to be. 
 
38 As Fara notes, that the second premise is to blame should not entail that there is wide spread 
agreement as to why it is to blame. This is a source of contention.  
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phenomenal sorites argument it is stipulated that there is no difference in how the two 
objects in consideration look, and if this is so, then there is no difference relevant for the 
application of any visual predicate. Or, in the self-torturer’s case, no difference relevant 
for the applicability of ‘feels painful’. 
The first consideration is more difficult. Against this consideration Fara must 
argue that we do not, and cannot, experience the kinds of phenomenal continuums that 
Quinn is imagining: continuums in which red paint gradually becomes yellow, or comfort 
gradually gives way to pain in a way that there is no difference in how narrow enough 
section of the continuum look or feel. The problem is further complicated because it is 
standardly assumed that denying that we have these kinds of phenomenal continua 
implies that our perceptual systems are perfectly accurate; therefore Fara must also show 
that denying we experience sorites style phenomenal continua does not implausibly imply 
that our perceptual systems are perfectly sensitive to changes in stimulus.  
Fara argues that the most plausible account of our perceptual limitation is that our 
perception is finite in the following sense: 
Perceptual Limitation Thesis:39  
For some sufficiently slight amount of change (in color, sound, or 
position, etc.), we cannot perceive an object as having changed by less 
than that amount unless we perceive it as not having changed at all (as 
having changed by zero amount).  
 
Fara grants that our perceptual systems may be limited in this way, but stresses that non-
transitivity does not automatically follow from this thesis. That our perceptual system is 
                                                          
39 Fara does not call this theses by this name. Fara initially presents two possible accounts called “a” and 
“b” and the one I have quoted here is her “b”. I have omitted A as Fara dismissed it as implausible and it is 
not a point Phillips contends.   
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limited in this way only entails that when we perceive something as changing it must 
change by at least some set amount—that we cannot have an experience of change less 
than that amount. But this does not entail that we could have a phenomenal continuum 
wherein adjacent color patches all looked the same but the end points did not, because 
our perceptual system being limited in this way is compatible with our experiencing 
change discretely: objects looking to take small, but sudden changes in color or position. 
Fara argues that to get non-transitivity we must also assert that we experience continuous 
changes, for then non-transitivity would follow.  
Fara argues that it is not obvious whether we experience continuous or discrete 
changes. She invites us to consider two possible experiences of a mouse cursor moving 
across a computer screen.  First imagine the visual experience of a mouse cursor looking 
to move discontinuously across the screen, and then an experience of a mouse cursor 
looking to move continuously-but-jerkily across a screen. Though both experiences 
would clearly be different it is difficult to say what experience you are having as you 
move your mouse cursor across the screen. Therefore, the fact that we seem to experience 
continuous movement and often characterize our experience as being experiences of 
continuous movement that does not mean that we actually have these experiences. It is 
possible that if we were having discontinuous experiences of a particular sort, we would 
still categorize them as continuous.  
Furthermore, even if we do experience a phenomenal continuum, it does not 
automatically follow that ‘feels the same as’ is not a transitive relation. All that is 
required of a spectrum to be continuous is that for any subsection of that spectrum 
representing a positive change in color, there is a narrower width of that subsection 
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wherein the color looks to change by less than the change of the wider subsection. This 
does not entail that we perceive narrow enough subsections of continuous changes as 
homogenous, which would entail that ‘looks the same as’ is intransitive. Fara considers 
one way we might motivate such a ‘homogeneity thesis’ on these grounds: It could be 
that when confronted by a phenomenal continuum—say, that of the slow motion of an 
hour hand of a clock moving around the clock face, we are not able to visually 
discriminate certain very close together positions. That is why the hour hand does not 
appear to move over a period of ten seconds. While the hour hand has, of course, moved, 
the position it has moved to is not far enough away from where it was for use to 
discriminate the distance. So it looks as if it has stood still. After a longer period of time, 
the hour hand has moved a great enough distance to be perceivable.  
 Fara thinks this explanation is implausible as it should leave us wondering why 
then all movement isn’t perceived as slow motion. The second hand sweeping around the 
clock face appears to be moving constantly, but if our above account of slow motion is 
correct there are certain changes in distance which should be perceived as no change at 
all. So for the sufficiently short enough distance wherein the second hand has not 
changed in position enough for that change to be perceived it ought to look as though it is 
standing still. Of course, it never looks to be standing still. So we ought to think that the 
homogeneity thesis, although possible, is likely false.40  
                                                          
40 Ian Phillips has raised some problems for this account. He argues that Fara has smuggled in an 
implausible “zoetrope” conception of the perception of time. This objection may successfully undercut 
Fara’s motivation for thinking that the homogeneity thesis is false, it does not provide any motivation for 
thinking the homogeneity thesis is true either. I will pay more attention to Phillip’s objections in a later 
section. Phillips, Ian (2011). Indiscriminability and experience of change. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245)  
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 If Fara rejects both the homogeneity thesis and the existence of phenomenal 
continua, how can she account for the very plausible intuition that we could be presented 
with a color spectrum wherein adjacent sections of the spectrum look the same and yet 
the end points do not?  
 Here Fara introduces a distinction between two stimuli looking different and 
noticing that two stimuli look different. Perhaps it is not the case, as our original 
phenomenal sorites argument suggested, that there could be a series a1 …an  such that 
Rai+1ai for all i. The reason we think that there could be such a series is that when 
confronted with a gradual change in color we often fail to notice the difference between 
how adjacent colors look.  For the hour hand example this would amount to saying that 
although the hour hand does look to be in a different position after ten seconds, we fail to 
notice this difference and hence report that the positon of the hour hand has not changed. 
 Fara’s overall argument could be tersely summarized as follows: We have good 
intuitive grounds to think that ‘looks the same as’ is a transitive relation because we have 
good reasons to think same-appearance claims are necessarily true in virtue of the 
meaning of the terms. We do not, however, have as strong a ground to think that the 
phenomenal continua needed to deny the transitivity of ‘looks the same as’ are possible. 
This is because one of the most common arguments in favor of such phenomenon: that 
our perceptual systems are finite, does not entail that phenomenal continua are possible, 
and even if phenomenal continua are possible, that does not itself entail that ‘looks the 
same as’ relations are non-transitive because it would not entail the homogeneity thesis. 
The homogeneity thesis is suspect because it seems to entail that we cannot have 
experiences as of constant motion. The intuitive plausibility that we do experience 
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phenomenal continua can be accounted for by appealing to a looks/notices distinction 
which is compatible with the transitivity of ‘looks the same as’ relations. Therefore we 
have reason to favor the transitivity of ‘looks the same as’ over the possibility of 
phenomenal continuums of the sorites variety.  
 If Fara’s argument is successful then we have good reason to doubt that the 
medical device of Quinn is actually possible. If the situation Quinn has imagined is not 
possible then there is no reason to think that the puzzles these situations generate 
constitute genuine examples of rational intransitive preferences. I will conclude this 
section by addressing some of the influential objections to Fara’s argument.  
Objections to Fara 
There have been a number of objections to Fara’s arguments, some of which are 
worth addressing. I will begin with objections raised by Ian Phillips and Phillipe Chuard 
who both raise a similar worry for Fara’s account.41 
Phillips argues that Fara makes a mistake in failing to draw a distinction between 
failing to notice a noticeable difference and there being no noticeable difference. Fara’s 
own example of failing to notice a friend’s haircut is an example of failing to notice a 
difference that is noticeable, however in the case of phenomenal continuums we typically 
take the differences in color between adjacent slices of a color spectrum to be differences 
that are not noticeable. Phillips argues that Fara’s account entails both that an 
unnoticeable object or event is perceived even though it is not noticeable, which is 
                                                          
41 Phillips, Ian (2011). Indiscriminability and experience of change. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):808 – 
827 and Chuard, Philippe (2010). Non-transitive Looks & fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):161 - 
200. 
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controversial enough as it is, and that there is no limit to the visual discriminations we 
can make. Phillips argues “if this [Fara’s] argument convinces us that a change in 
position as small as 1/6o is visible but not noticeable, we must also allow that changes of 
1/6,000,000o are visible but not noticeable.”  
Philippe Chuard also argues that Fara’s argument entails that our powers of visual 
perception are infallible. Chuard first invites us to consider that our powers of perception 
are limited in the following way:  
(LCP) for any two coloured objects χ and y where the chromatic 
differences between χ and y is less than L but more than zero, veridical visual 
experiences of χ and y represent χ and y in the same way with respect to their 
colour.42 
 
We are then asked to imagine three green objects o1, o2, and o3 whose spectral values 
are o1 = 526-528 nm, o2 = 525-527 nm, and o3 = 524-526 nm.43  
Chuard’s argument then proceeds as follows:  
 
1. There are limitations L on the way in which the human visual system 
represents colours such that, for any two coloured objects χ and y, 
where the chromatic differences between χ and y is less than L but 
more than zero, veridical visual experiences of χ and y represent χ and 
y in the same way with respect to their colour. 
2. χ and y look chromatically different to S if and only if S's experience 
of χ and y (if it is veridical) represents χ and y differently with respect 
to their colour.  
3. Since the chromatic difference between o1 and o2 is below L, veridical 
experiences of o1 and o2 represent the colour of o1 and the colour of 
o2 in the same way. 
4. Since the chromatic difference between o2 and o3 is below L, veridical 
experiences of o2 and o3 represent the colour of o2 and the colour of 
o3 in the same way.  
                                                          
42 Ibid. 179 
 
43 The exact differences in value are not all that important for his argument so long as they are small 
enough to fall below L.  
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5. Since the chromatic difference between o1 and o3 is above L, veridical 
experiences of o1 and o3 represent the colour of o1 and the colour of 
o3 different. 
6. o1 and o2 look chromatically the same & o2 and o3 look chromatically 
the same & o1 and o3 look chromatically different. 
7. (ntl) is true: there are coloured patches such that the relation of looking 
chromatically the same as between such patches is non-transitive.44 
 
 Chuard argues that if one seeks to defend the transitivity of looks the same as, the 
only plausible premise to deny is the first premise, however Chuard argues that denying 
the first premise entails that we have no perceptual limitations on wavelength 
discriminations. “The argument shows that looks-fallibilists are forced to deny the 
existence of perceptual limitations on wavelength discrimination.”45 
  Both Phillips and Chuard argue to the effect that if we take what Fara has argued 
to be true we are committed to denying that our powers of perception are limited in a 
certain respect even though they clearly do seem to be limited in that respect. I will now 
argue that Fara’s position does not imply these implausible conclusions.  
 The first point I wish to make in defending Fara is against an objection of 
Phillips: “Fara’s noticing-based account must insist that an object or event can be 
perceived even though it is unnoticeable. This is not something we naturally admit in 
other cases, and it is far from clear that it is coherent.”46 Against this I would first ask 
what is it that Fara is claiming we might not notice? Fara need not claim that we can 
perceive something that is unnoticeable. Fara is out to defend the transitivity of ‘looks the 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 181 
 
45 Ibid. 190 
 
46 Rosanna Keefe raises the same point in Keefe, Rosanna (2011). Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and 
Looking the Same. Dialectica 65 (3):327-344 
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same as’, so what is at issue here is our ability to notice the difference between the 
relevant aspects of phenomenal states. The question then is, is it possible for a subject to 
experience two phenomenal states that are different is some respect without being able to 
notice what the difference is? As I have already argued in my example of the Warlock 
and the self-torturer, these can come apart.  We could further imagine a being who is like 
us but for the fact that the being has no memory whatsoever, including sensory memory. I 
take it that though the phenomenal states of that being would no doubt be different than 
our own, we could plausibly assume, that this being would still have phenomenal states, 
throughout the life of this being its phenomenal states would change, and the being would 
not be able to notice any difference between these phenomenal states; however, this is 
perfectly compatible with the transitivity of ‘looks the same as’.  
 What about the more substantive objection that Fara’s argument entails that we 
have perfect powers of discrimination? Clearly if the correct way to cash out our 
perceptual limitations is Chuard’s LCP, then the intransitivity of ‘looks the same as’ is a 
short step away as his argument demonstrates. Furthermore this argument is perfectly 
compatible with the distinction between two phenomenal states being different and not 
noticing this difference. Against his objection I will argue that Chuard’s principle is not 
the only to cash out our perceptual limitations, nor is it the best way.  
 To see why Phillips’ and Chuard’s objections fail it is important to review why 
Fara posits the looks/notices distinction in the first place. Fara is trying to give an account 
of our reputed experiences as of homogeneity between small enough regions of supposed 
phenomenal continua. The looks/notices argument is supposed to explain why it is that 
we might report that adjacent regions of a supposed continuum look the same even if they 
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do not look the same. The only reason this argument would entail that there is no limit to 
the visual discriminations we can make is if one held that if our powers of discrimination 
are finite, then sorites-type phenomenal continua are possible, but this is a claim Fara 
explicitly rejects when she introduces the perceptual limitation thesis. Fara argues 
persuasively that the perceptual limitation thesis does not entail that we experience 
phenomenal continua. Recall that the perceptual limitation thesis held:  
 Perceptual Limitation Thesis:  
For some sufficiently slight amount of change (in color, sound, or 
position, etc.), we cannot perceive an object as having changed by less 
than that amount unless we perceive it as not having changed at all (as 
having changed by zero amount). 
 
All that this thesis entails is that “when we experience an object as changing we 
experience it as changing by at least some given amount.”47  
 One way we might cash out the perceptual limitations with respect to color 
perception consistent with Fara’s perceptual limitation thesis is as follows: First, the total 
number of distinct shades we are capable of perceptually representing is less than the 
number of possible wavelengths of light relevant for color. Second, this limitation is 
manifest in our perceptual experiences in the following way: under constant 
circumstances and instances of veridical perception, for each shade of color our visual 
system can potentially represent, there is a range of wavelengths such that objects 
reflecting light within that range will look to have the same shade of color.48 But this is 
                                                          
47 Fara, Delia Graff (2001). Phenomenal continua and the sorites. Mind 110 (440):905-935.p. 919 
 
48 I specify constant circumstances and veridical experiences to obviate worries that how color is 
represented is sensitive not only to differences in the wavelength of reflected light, but also to other 
factors, like whether the subject is depressed or under the influence of drugs, and also to rule out cases of 
hallucination or illusions. 
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perfectly compatible with the denial of Chuard’s LCP and compatible with the 
transitivity of ‘looks the same as’. This entails that there are differences in wavelength 
that we cannot perceptually represent, not because the differences are too small, but 
because the wavelengths fall within the range of wavelengths that are all represented as 
one particular shade of color. This also entails the denial of LCP as whenever the 
wavelength of light changes from one range to another it is represented as being a 
different shade of color even if this difference is extremely small.  
I take it that the picture I have sketched is possible and the only question that 
remains is what picture is in fact representative of our perceptual limitations. This is 
ultimately an empirical question. I don’t know for certain which picture is empirically 
correct, but I can offer the following argument in favor of my picture. My picture is 
compatible with (1): the plausible assumption that our powers of perception are limited. It 
is compatible with (2): the plausible assumption that we often seem to have experiences 
as of sorites style phenomenal continuums—because although there are small differences 
in the objects look to us, we don’t always notice this difference, hence we report that 
adjacent color patches look the same even though they actually don’t. Finally, it is 
compatible with (3) the truth of same appearance claims like “If A looks the same as B 
then if A looks red, so does B”. Alternatively, Chuard and Phillips’ position does no 
better in explaining why we take (1) and (2) to be true, and entails the denial of (3), so we 
ought to prefer my picture.  
Fara has given a cogent argument that we do not in fact experience sorites style 
phenomenal continua and given the plausibility of Fara’s perceptual limitation thesis, 
neither Phillips’ nor Chuard’s objections were successful. Although the context of Fara’s 
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argument concerned our ability to perceive slight differences in color, the argument 
generalizes to our ability to feel pain.49 We therefore have good evidence to suppose that 
contrary to what Quinn has supposed, there could not be a series of adjacent settings such 
that there was no phenomenal difference between adjacent settings yet the first and last 
settings feel radically different. If such a situation is not possible, we need not worry that 
it poses a threat to the transitivity of preferences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Alex Voorhoeve and Ken Binmore give a nice argument along these lines: “For consider a device that 
registers charge only in whole kilovolts. If we hooked this device to a machine that administered a current 
of varying voltage, started with the dial at 0 and kept increasing the charge by small increments, then at 
some point the device will change from registering '0 kV to registering '1 kV. This implies that there are no 
just-noticeable differences in the sense under discussion for this device, even though its capacities of 
discrimination are limited.” This is, in effect, what I have argued of our perception of color applied to the 
perception of electricity.  
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SECTION THREE 
The second strategy against transitivity I will be considering has not received as 
much attention as Quinn’s puzzle yet it is potentially more problematic. This strategy 
elicits an intransitive preference ordering amongst options which are compared with 
respect to a plurality of values and considerations. In this section I consider a candidate 
counterexample to transitivity advanced by Larry Temkin in Weighing Goods: Some 
Questions and Comments which employs this strategy and argue it is unsuccessful. 
Temkin’s argument involves the comparison of three alternatives via multiple values and 
factors; however, because each alternative under consideration is sufficiently dissimilar 
from the others, relevant factors in comparing some alternatives do not apply when 
comparing others. From this Temkin argues an intransitive preference ordering can 
rationally result.50 After explain Temkin’s argument in detail I will argue that as it is 
stands, it is not clear that a rational intransitive preference ordering will result from his 
example. I will argue that this ambiguity is due to the vagueness with which Temkin has 
presented his argument. I will first attempt to repair Temkin’s argument, applying some 
intuitive distinctions employed in the literature concerning incomparability to make 
                                                          
50 Temkin, Larry S. (1994). Weighing goods: Some questions and comments. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 23 (4):350-380. Kenneth May has given a similar argument. Where Temkin argues that 
intransitivity results because some values or factors apply to some comparisons but not others, because 
the objects under consideration are sufficiently different, May argues that intransitivity could result from 
a kind of intrapersonal Condorcet paradox. While Temkin argues that his intransitivity is rational, May is 
concerned solely with a descriptive account of intransitivity and does not argue that the agent is rational; 
however William A. Edmundson has argued that the agent in May’s example could be rational in forming 
her intransitive preferences. I have not included this discussion here as I think Temkin’s argument is 
stronger and in any case the final reasons I give for rejecting Temkin’s argument will also cover 
Edmundson’s argument. Kenneth O. May, 1954, “Intransitivity, Utility, and the aggregation of preference 
patterns,” Econometrica 1-23. Edmundson, William A. (2009). Pluralism, Intransitivity, Incoherence. In 
Mark White (ed.), Theoretical Foundations of Law and Economics. Cambridge University Press 
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Temkin’s argument more precise. Finally, I will argue that even this more precise version 
of Temkin’s argument fails. 
Temkin’s Counterexample  
  Temkin’s argument against transitivity begins with a plausible judgement:  
How two outcomes compare all things considered depends on how they 
compare in terms of the relevant factors for making that comparison. Thus, if 
different factors were relevant for comparing different outcomes, it could be true 
that even if A were better than B, and B better than C in terms of the relevant 
factors for comparing those alternatives, A might not be better than C, in terms of 
the relevant factors for making that comparison… For example, suppose that 
factors x and y are each relevant when comparing A,B,and C, but that another 
factor, z, is only relevant when comparing A and C. Then it might be that, all 
things considered, A is better than B (regarding x and Y), and B is better than C 
(regarding x and y), but C is better than A. This could be so if C was sufficiently 
better than A regarding z. to outweigh the extent to which it was worse than A 
regarding x and y. 51 
Temkin provides an example of the kind of situation he is imagining. We are 
asked to consider three job applicants Sue, a white woman, Maria, a Hispanic woman, 
and Ella, a black woman. The person evaluating the job applicants is charged with 
picking the best candidate in light of their overall qualifications and an affirmative action 
policy. The person in charge of hiring reasons as follows. Sue is a better candidate than 
Maria, because of her qualifications and experience. Maria is a better candidate than Ella 
because of her qualifications and experience. However, Ella is a better candidate than 
Sue, because the affirmative action policy trumps their difference in qualifications and 
experience. An intransitive preference ordering results. 
                                                          
51 Ibid. 361-62 Once again Temkin is arguing for the intransitivity of “better than” but this generates an 
intransitive preference ordering so long as we are operating under the plausible principle that rationality 
requires that one prefers what they believe to be the better option. 
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The obvious place to balk seems the invocation of the affirmative action policy in 
comparing Sue and Ella. Temkin’s justification is that while blacks were not enslaved by 
Hispanics, they were once enslaved by whites, and Hispanics were neither enslaved by 
whites, nor by blacks. This justifies giving greater preference to blacks over whites than 
whites over Hispanics or blacks over Hispanics. Of course it is of little importance 
whether this is actually the reason for affirmative action policies in the real world or if the 
historical details are accurate, Temkin just needs a semi-plausible example. But is it 
semi-plausible? I have some doubts.  
What I have argued so far is that preferences are rational in so far as the reasons 
for the preferences are rational. This affirmative action policy does not seem rational as 
there does not seem to be a good reason to only apply this policy when comparing a black 
person with a white person. If, as Temkin suggests, the justification is that black people 
should get preferential treatment because they have been oppressed in ways whites and 
Hispanics have not, why wouldn’t this apply when comparing blacks and Hispanics? If 
the reasoning is that whites should be punished for oppressing blacks, why wouldn’t this 
apply to when comparing whites and Hispanics? What is needed is a rational justification 
of an affirmative action policy that would only apply to the comparison of blacks and 
whites.52  
                                                          
52 Someone might respond that this line of objection misses the forest for the trees. The point is that the 
person evaluating the job candidates has a rule which only “kicks in” under certain conditions and the 
following of this rule generates the intransitive preference ordering the justification for that rule is only 
minimally important.  If this is how the argument is supposed to work then why not just make a rule that 
says, if A is better than B and B is better than C, then consider C to be better than A”? Surely such a rule 
doesn’t answer the question as to whether intransitive preferences really are rational.  
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Temkin has not yet offered a plausible counterexample to transitivity. Temkin’s 
argument is that an intransitive preference ordering could result when the relevant 
considerations for forming preferences differ according to which alternatives are being 
compared, but Temkin has not provided an example in which this is clearly the case, nor 
has Temkin provided independent philosophical motivations for thinking that this is true. 
However, Ruth Chang has provided motivation for thinking that the relevant 
considerations for comparing alternatives depend on the alternatives under consideration. 
In what follows I will borrow from Chang’s work on parity to construct a more precise 
counterexample to transitivity. After constructing this counterexample I will argue that 
this version also fails to undermine transitivity.   
 In her introduction to Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason 
Ruth Chang argues that comparisons must proceed in terms of a ‘value’, where a value is 
“any consideration with respect to which a meaningful evaluative comparison must be 
made. Call such a consideration a ‘covering value’ of that comparison.”53 The idea is that 
one cannot compare two things simpliciter, they must be compared with respect to some 
value. For example, it is often said that one cannot compare apples and oranges, but 
according to Chang, all that is needed is an appropriate covering value and once one is in 
mind, apples and oranges are perfectly comparable. If we wish to compare apples and 
oranges with respect to pedagogical usefulness for teaching the color orange, oranges are 
                                                          
53 Chang, Ruth (ed.) (1997). Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason. Harvard University 
Press. 5 Here Chang uses ‘covering value’ though in her later publications on parity she uses ‘covering 
consideration’. I will use both interchangeably.  
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better than apples. If we wish to know which is better for keeping away medical 
professionals, apples are better than oranges. 
 A covering value can have many ‘contributory values’. For example if I am 
trying to decide what hospital would be best for my family, the covering value ‘suitability 
for my family’ will have contributory values like professionalism of the staff, cleanliness, 
proximity to my home, cost, and others.  Chang calls the degree to which an item does 
well according to its covering value its ‘merit’. Chang argues that many putative 
examples of incomparability are really just cases where no covering value has been 
specified.  
 Chang uses the assumption that all comparisons must proceed with respect a 
covering value to motivate a distinction between incomparability and noncomparability. 
Not all covering values apply to every pair of options. I can’t compare the number 9 and 
the number 7 with respect to gustatory pleasure, nor can I compare a cup of tea and a 
gingerbread cookie with respect to musical talent. In order for two options to be 
comparable with respect to a covering value, the covering value must ‘cover’ the options 
under consideration. Chang specifies that “for each two-place comparability predicate, 
there is a domain of pairs of items to which the predicate can apply.”54 Chang argues that 
unless a covering value has both items under consideration in its domain then they are 
neither comparable nor incomparable with respect to that covering value. This is a formal 
                                                          
54 Ibid. 28 
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failure of comparison, and the items are noncomparable with respect to that covering 
value.55  
 Importantly for our purposes, for two options to be comparable with respect to a 
covering value, the covering value must cover both of the options. If the covering value 
covers one of the options, but doesn’t cover the other, the options are noncomparable 
with respect to that covering value.  
 Chang does not think noncomparability is a threat to practical reason:  
Practical reason never confronts agents with comparisons that could 
formally fail…. Practical reason does not require us to compare noncomparables; 
as rational agents, we will never be confronted… with a choice between a lamp 
and a window for prime minister. Indeed no choice could ever have as its 
justification or its justifying force a comparison of the alternatives with respect to 
a value that does not cover them.56 
 
I am less optimistic that noncomparability is not a threat to practical reasoning. In 
fact I think we can build from Chang’s noncomparability an intransitive preference 
ordering in Temkin-fashion.  
 In order to generate my counterexample to transitivity, I need one more 
assumption in addition to what Chang has argued so far. My assumption is that if a 
covering value can fail to cover both items of a comparison, so can a contributing value 
of that cover value. With this we can generate our counterexample to transitivity.  
 
                                                          
55 Two options would be incomparable if two options are covered by the same covering value, but the 
trichotomy thesis fails. That is, the objects under consideration are neither better, nor worse, nor equal to 
each other. Michelangelo and Mozart are within the domain of ‘creative geniuses’ but it might not be 
possible to compare the two in terms of who is the better creative genius.  Chang calls this a substantive 
failure of comparison.  
 
56 Ibid. 29 
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Temkin’s Counterexample Improved 
Tiffany is at home considering what to do with her Friday night when she 
fortuitously receives three emails. The first email is from Chuck, a good friend. Chuck is 
getting a group of six friends together this Friday for a taco party at Alonzo’s Taqueria 
and wants to know if Tiffany would like to come. The second email is from Brittany, an 
equally good friend, who has four tickets to go to the ballet this Friday and would like to 
invite Tiffany and some mutual friends. The third email is a congratulatory email from 
her work, Tiffany has won a ticket to a renowned food art festival in town this Friday 
night. Tiffany has three options to compare A, Alonzo’s, B, the ballet, and C, the 
congratulatory food art festival. The covering value with respect to which she will make 
this comparison is ‘better use of a Friday night.’ For Tiffany this covering value has three 
relevant contributory values: friendship, artistic beauty, and quality food. 
Tiffany consider whether it would be a better use of a Friday night to go to 
Alonzo’s to spend time with friends or to go to the ballet with friends. Tiffany is 
evaluating these options in light of the three contributory values, food, friendship 
building, and art. She judges that she cannot compare A to B with respect to food, as 
there is no food at the ballet. Neither can she compare A to B with respect to art as 
Alonzo’s is not a place of art. She can compare A and B with respect to friendship, and 
because Alonzo’s has more friends than the ballet, she prefers A to B with respect to the 
covering value: better use of a Friday night.  
Tiffany compares B to C. Tiffany cannot compare B to C with respect to 
friendship as the food art festival is a solitary endeavor. She cannot compare B to C with 
respect to food, as once again there is no food at the ballet. She can, however, compare B 
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to C with respect to art as they are both places of artistic expression. Tiffany judges B to 
be better a use of a Friday night than C as she prefers ballet as a form of art to food art.  
Finally Tiffany compares C to A. She cannot compare C to A in terms of 
friendship as the food art festival is a solitary outing. She can’t compare C to A in terms 
of Art as Alonzo’s is not an establishment of Art. She can however compare C to A in 
terms of food. The food art festival will be home to some of the greatest edible art in the 
world, and Alonzo’s is good, but not spectacular. Therefore, Tiffany judges C to be a 
better use of a Friday night than A as it has better food than A.  
Tiffany’s preferences are intransitive. She prefers A to B because of the 
contributory values that cover both A and B, A is better than B. She prefers B to C for the 
same reason, as with C and A.57 Her reasoning seems perfectly rational in light of Ruth 
Chang’s plausible assumption regarding the comparability of alternatives.  
I take it that this counterexample is along the lines of what Temkin had in mind 
when he claimed that the factors relevant for comparison differ depending on the 
alternatives, and that this could generate an intransitive preference ordering. However, 
whereas Temkin’s argument was unclear as to why the relevant factors did not apply to 
certain comparisons, my method is not as I have utilized Chang’s plausible distinction 
between comparability and noncomparability. I take it that the counterexample I have 
proposed is stronger than Temkin’s, the question remains as to whether or not it is 
persuasive. I will now argue that it is not.  
                                                          
57 One might object that surely there are more contributory values than the three I have considered: 
financial cost, health, productivity, etc. Just assumed that while there are other contributory values that 
apply to all three, Tiffany is indifferent: she judges A, B and C to be equal in regards to all other 
contributory values.  
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The counterexample to transitivity I have been developing is not persuasive 
because it is based on a false premise. The false premise is that a covering value must 
cover both items for those items to be comparable with respect to that value. Instead I 
will argue that a covering value need only cover one of the two items for those items to 
be comparable with respect to that value. I will begin by trying to motivate this objection 
with a thought experiment.  
Improved Counterexample Rejected 
Regrettable Rick: 
Imagine Rick has been tasked with picking up lunch for his boss. His boss 
has written him a note with clear instructions “go to the sandwich shop and order 
for me the best tasting thing available.” Rick, who is very obedient, goes to the 
sandwich shop and asks the attendant for their available options. The attendant 
responds that they only have two options today: the turkey club or the special, 
which is an mp3 file of Mozart’s greatest works. Rick becomes confused. He 
knows he is supposed to order the best tasting thing, but he finds Mozart’s 
greatest hits and the turkey club to be noncomparable with respect to taste as 
Mozart’s greatest hits does not fall within the domain of ‘better with respect to 
taste’. Rick returns to his manager empty handed having been unable to choose 
the best amongst noncomparable options. He is promptly fired.  
 
I expect that Rick’s boss was right for firing Rick and that she was displeased for 
good reason: Rick should have ordered the turkey club. It was obviously the better 
choice, but where did Rick go wrong? Rick’s mistake was thinking that because Mozart’s 
music does not fall within the domain of ‘better with respect to taste’ that it is non 
comparable with the alternative that is within the domain of ‘better with respect to taste’. 
This is where I take Chang to be mistaken. I will now offer my alternative picture.  
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Items are comparable with respect to a covering value so long as one of the items 
falls within the domain of the covering value.58 When both items are within the relevant 
domain, items are compared in terms of merit—that is, they are compared in terms of 
which better satisfies the relevant covering value. When only one item falls within the 
domain of the relevant covering value, the alternatives are compared in terms of which 
satisfies the value at all (where satisfying the value means it has some positive merit 
relative to the covering consideration). If the item that is within the domain of the 
covering value satisfies that covering value, it is de facto better than the alternative with 
respect to that covering value. If it dissatisfies the value (negative merit), then the agent 
ought to be indifferent between the alternatives with respect to the covering value. If the 
covering value does not cover either of the alternative under consideration, the 
alternatives are noncomparable just as in Chang’s picture.  
I will try to clarify my alternative picture in light of the Tiffany example. When 
Tiffany compares Alonzo’s with the ballet she is right to conclude that Alonzo’s does not 
fall within the domain of ‘better with respect to Art’ just as she is right to conclude that 
the ballet does not fall within the domain of ‘better with respect to food’. However, she is 
wrong to infer from this that A and B are noncomparable with respect to these 
contributory values. This is because, according to my picture, only one of the options 
needs to be covered by the covering value for the options to be comparable with respect 
to that covering value. Alonzo’s is covered by the value of ‘better in terms of food’ so 
Alonzo’s can be compared with the ballet even though the ballet is not. 
                                                          
58 This is, of course, a point of departure from Chang, however I think it is correct.  
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According to the picture I am advancing, when only one of the items is covered 
by the relevant covering value, the alternatives are compared in terms of whether the 
alternatives satisfy the value. ‘Satisfying the value’ means that the option has some 
positive merit in light of that value. Alonzo’s has good food and hence has positive merit 
in light of the covering value food. The ballet has no food and hence is not positive 
(though not negative) with respect to food. Hence Alonzo’s is better than the ballet in 
terms of food and, for the same reasons, the ballet is better than Alonzo’s in terms of art.  
What if only one alternative is covered by the relevant value, but the covered 
option is negative in light of the relevant value? Suppose Rick had gone to the sandwich 
job just as before, but in this scenario the options were either the Mp3 file or a two week 
old meatball marinara sub which has begun to turn a shade of green. The meatball 
marinara does fall within the domain of tastiness, while the Mp3 file does not. According 
to the picture I am proposing they are comparable with respect to tastiness. When the 
covered item is negative in light of that value the option equal to the non-positive 
alternative. That is, in the meatball version of Regrettable Rick Rick ought to be 
indifferent between the moldy meatball sandwich and the Mp3 file as neither satisfy the 
covering value.59  
In light of these considerations we can dismantle my improved counterexample to 
transitivity. Recall that the options under consideration are tacos with friends at Alonzo’s, 
                                                          
59 I could be wrong about this. I could see ranking the meatball sandwich as being judged less tasty than 
the Mp3 file for the reason that while the Mp3 file does not satisfy the value, because it has no taste, the 
meatball sandwich dissatisfies the value. This is interesting and worth considering, but doesn’t affect the 
strength of my argument.  
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ballet with fewer friends, and food art festival with no friends. Under the assumption that 
a covering value had to cover both items for those items to be comparable, Tiffany 
generated an intransitive preference ordering. Under my alternative picture, however, no 
intransitivity results. Consider the following table representing the merit of each 
alternative with respect to the relevant covering value: 60  
Table1 Friendship Art Food 
Alonzo’s 2 - 1 
Ballet 1 2 - 
Food Art - 1 2 
 
Because Alonzo’s involves more friends than the ballet it has more merit than the 
ballet with respect to friendship. The food art is not covered by the covering value of 
friendship so it is no positive value with respect to friendship but is not negative either. 
The ballet is better in terms of art than the food art festival and hence has one more merit 
than the food art festival. Finally the Food art festival is better than Alonzo’s in terms of 
food and received one more merit than Alonzo’s. The result is that each option is better in 
terms of one value, worse, but positive, in terms of another, and not positive in terms of 
another. Assuming Tiffany values friendship, art, and food equally, that is to say that 
neither is more important than the other, then Tiffany ought to be indifferent amongst the 
alternatives. If one value is more important than the others than the option with the most 
                                                          
60 Obviously the values I have put in to the table are arbitrarily chosen. However the main point is that the 
options with the most merits are to be preferred, and as ‘greater than’ is necessarily transitive, the 
resulting preference ordering will be transitive. 
61 
 
merit with respect to that value will be the most preferred, and the option with the least 
positive merit will be least preferred. Either way, Transitivity is preserved.  
I don’t imagine that I have offered the final word on counterexamples to 
transitivity that adopt Temkin’s strategy; however, the arguments I have given at least 
show that it is far from obvious that there is a genuine counterexample to transitivity to 
be derived from pluralism about value. Therefore the burden of proof is with those who 
wish to reject transitivity.  
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CONCLUSION 
 This thesis set out to accomplish two main objectives. The first was to show that 
there is a genuine debate to be had concerning transitivity of preferences. Two of the 
most prominent arguments for transitivity were considered and found wanting. While 
these arguments may suffice to put the burden of proof on those who think intransitive 
preferences can be rational, they are far from the final word on the topic. In light of this I 
considered two putative counterexamples to transitivity which employ two very different 
strategies. The first counterexample I considered was Quinn’s puzzle to the self-torturer. I 
considered two interpretations of this puzzle and argued that neither posed a genuine 
counter example to transitivity. I then considered a counterexample from Larry Temkin 
which argued that intransitive preference could result when the options under 
consideration were sufficiently different that the relevant factors for comparing some of 
the options were irrelevant in comparing others. I considered one reason that this could 
be true and ultimately rejected that it could generate an intransitive preference ordering.  
 The implication of my arguments is that we should continue to think that 
transitivity is a rational constraint of preferences, but it is important to note that I have far 
from proven that rational preferences are necessarily transitive. Furthermore there are 
other counterexamples to transitivity that I have not considered here. My final conclusion 
is that while there is some good reasons for thinking that transitivity is a constraint on 
preferences, it is ultimately a live question worthy of further philosophical debate.  
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